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Optimal Two-Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty
Abstract
This paper examines the two-part pricing problem of a risk-neutral monopoly (the seller) for a
good sold to buyers who face uncertainty about their demand for the good. If buyers are risk neutral,
we show that marginal-cost pricing is not only profit-maximizing but also socially efficient. If buyers
are risk averse, the demand uncertainty calls for the insurance need of buyers, which induces the seller
to deviate from marginal-cost pricing. We show that the optimal unit price is higher or lower than
the constant marginal cost, depending on the nature of the good (normal or inferior) and on the signs
of cross-derivatives of buyers’ multivariate utility function. Employing a quasi-linear specification
that reduces the general multivariate utility function to a special univariate utility function, we show
that the seller optimally raises (lowers) the unit price and lowers (raises) the fixed fee from their
risk-neutral counterparts if buyers’ total and marginal benefits are positively (negatively) correlated.
We further show that these results are robust to the introduction of competition to the seller.
JEL classification: D11; D42; D81; L11
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1. Introduction
Two-part pricing requires consumers to pay a fixed fee upfront to secure the right to purchase
a good or service at a predetermined unit price. Examples of firms using two-part pricing
abound. The classical example is Disneyland that charges each visitor of its amusement
park an admission fee and a price per ride (see Oi, 1971). Other examples include beach
resorts, health clubs, mobile telephone companies, and commercial banks, to name just a
few.
Since the seminal work of Oi (1971), there has been a large literature that examines two-
part pricing as a means of price discrimination.1 In the standard analysis wherein consumers
are homogeneous and uncertainty is absent, the extant literature shows that a monopolistic
firm using two-part pricing optimally sets the unit price equal to the constant marginal cost,
and charges the fixed fee that seizes the entire consumer’s surplus arising from marginal-
cost pricing. A notable exception is Hayes (1987). She introduces uncertainty about future
demand for a good to risk-averse buyers when they decide to subscribe to a two-part pricing
1For an excellent survey on price discrimination, see Armstrong (2006).
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contract offered by a risk-neutral seller who supplies the good. Ex-ante demand uncertainty
is driven by an unknown state variable (e.g., income, weather, health, etc.). Buyers make
their consumption plans ex post after the state variable has been revealed. Hayes (1987)
shows that the seller has incentives to deviate from marginal-cost pricing so as to cater the
insurance need of buyers in the presence of demand uncertainty.2
To fix the idea, take beach resorts as an example. We can treat the uncertain weather
as the state variable. Beach resorts charge risk-averse tourists for the hotel rooms, which
can be regarded as the fixed fee. Suppose that tourists’ marginal utility of income increases
as the weather improves. If the weather is good (bad), tourists’ demand for beach activities
such as sailing and diving is likely to be high (low). In this case, the optimal two-part
pricing is to price the beach activities below their marginal costs and charge a higher fixed
fee. While risk-averse tourists suffers utility losses in bad weather because of the high fixed
fee, they benefit from utility gains in good weather because of low usage charges. Since
marginal utility of income increases as the weather improves, utility gains must out-weight
utility losses so that tourists’ expected utility increases. This is the insurance benefit offered
by the optimal two-part pricing to risk-averse tourists. On the other hand, tourists’ demand
for indoor activities such as spa treatments and gym facilities is likely to be high (low) if the
weather is bad (good). The optimal two-part pricing is then to price the indoor activities
above their marginal costs and charges a lower fixed fee. Risk-averse tourists encounter
utility losses in bad weather because of high usage charges, but they enjoy utility gains in
good weather because of the low fixed fee. Since marginal utility of income increases as
the weather improves, utility gains must out-weight utility losses, which offers insurance
to risk-averse tourists. When tourists’ marginal utility of income decreases as the weather
improves, the opposite pricing rules would apply. In any case, the optimal two-part pricing
plays an insurance role in protecting risk-averse buyers against demand uncertainty.
The purposes of this paper are to re-examine the model of Hayes (1987) in general, and
derive sufficient conditions based on exogenous model restrictions under which the optimal
pricing rule can be unambiguously characterized in particular.3 When buyers are risk
neutral, we show that marginal-cost pricing is not only optimal for the profit-maximizing
seller, but also efficient in the social welfare perspective, where social welfare is defined
as the expected joint surplus of buyers and the seller. These are the celebrated results of
Oi (1971) extended to the case of demand uncertainty. When buyers are risk averse, we
2If buyers are risk neutral, marginal-cost pricing remains optimal in the presence of demand uncertainty
(see Proposition 1). Hence, it is indeed the insurance need of buyers that induces the seller to deviate from
marginal-cost pricing.
3Hayes (1987) shows that the optimal unit price is larger (smaller) than the constant marginal cost if the
marginal utility of all other goods and the consumption of the good are negatively (positively) correlated at
the optimum, which by itself is endogenously determined and thus cannot constitute a sufficient condition.
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derive sufficient conditions under which the optimal unit price is higher or lower than the
constant marginal cost. We show that the sufficient conditions include, among others, the
differential Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property that is commonly found in monotone
comparative statics analysis (see Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; Edlin and Shannon, 1998).
We then follow Png and Wang (2010) to consider a special case of Hayes (1987) wherein a
quasi-linear specification is imposed to reduce buyers’ general multivariate utility function
to an univariate utility function. We show that the seller optimally raises (lowers) the unit
price and lowers (raises) the fixed fee from their risk-neutral counterparts if buyers’ total
and marginal benefits are positively (negatively) correlated, which are consistent with the
results of the general model of Hayes (1987).
As in Png and Wang (2010), we conduct comparative static analysis with respect to
an increase in buyers’ risk aversion. Confined to buyers’ preferences that exhibit constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA), we show that the marginal effect of increased risk aversion
of buyers on the optimal two-part pricing contract inherits the global effect of risk aversion.4
When buyers become more risk averse, there is greater insurance need that is catered for by
moving the optimal unit price further away from the constant marginal cost. Our results
complement to those of Png and Wang (2010) in that we analyze not only the impact on
the optimal unit price but also that on the optimal fixed fee. Finally, we introduce compe-
tition to the seller in a reduced form by using the Nash bargaining solution to determine
the optimal two-part pricing contract. This formulation subsumes monopoly and perfect
competition as two extreme cases wherein the seller has all or none of the bargaining power,
respectively, both of which have already been studied by Png and Wang (2010). We show
that imposing competition onto the seller by means of the Nash bargaining solution does not
qualitatively alter the optimal two-part pricing contract. Indeed, when buyers’ preferences
exhibit CARA, the optimal unit price is completely neutral to the extent of competition
(as measured by the degree of bargaining power possessed by the seller), even though the
optimal fixed fee increases as competition becomes lax.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model of Hayes
(1987). Section 3 derives the optimal two-part pricing contract when buyers are risk neutral,
and that when buyers are risk averse. Section 4 considers a special case in which a quasi-
linear specification is imposed to reduce buyers’ multivariate utility function to an univariate
utility function as in Png and Wang (2010). Within this simplified framework, we conduct
comparative static analysis with respect to an increase in buyers’ risk aversion and to the
4Due to the binding participation constraint of buyers at the optimum, the usual characterization of
increased risk aversion (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964; Diamond and Stiglitz, 1974) does not give us clear
guidance to study the marginal effect of increased risk aversion of buyers on the optimal two-part pricing
contract, except in the special case of CARA (see Section 4.1).
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introduction of competition to the seller. The final section concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a monopoly (henceforth the seller) who produces a good at a known constant
marginal cost, c > 0.5 The seller sells the good to buyers who face uncertainty about their
demand for the good. To facilitate sales, the seller uses a two-part pricing contract, (T, p),
where T is the fixed fee paid (received if negative) by a buyer ex ante (i.e., before resolving
the underlying uncertainty) to secure the right to purchase the good at the predetermined
unit price, p, ex post (i.e., after resolving the underlying uncertainty). The seller is risk
neutral and devises the two-part pricing contract, (T, p), ex ante to maximize his expected
profit.6
All buyers have the same initial wealth, I > 0, to be allocated for the consumption
of the good and all other goods. Following Hayes (1987), we assume that buyers are risk
averse and possess the same ex-post utility function, U(q, m, s), where q is the number of
units of the good, m is the consumption of all other goods, and s is the realization of a
state variable, s̃, that is unknown ex ante.7 Let F (s) be the known cumulative distribution
function of the state variable, s̃, over support [s, s] with s < s, which may either be indepen-
dent or be perfectly correlated among buyers. Risk aversion requires that Uq(q, m, s) > 0,
Um(q, m, s) > 0, Uqq(q, m, s) < 0, and Umm(q, m, s) < 0, where subscripts always signify
partial derivatives throughout the paper.8
The sequence of moves is as follows. Before the state variable, s̃, is revealed, the seller
offers the two-part pricing contract, (T, p), to buyers. If a buyer pays the fixed fee, T , to
the seller, she obtains the right to purchase as many units of the good as she wants at
the unit price, p, after s̃ has been revealed.9 Specifically, the buyer chooses q and m to
maximize her ex-post utility, U(q, m, s), subject to the budget constraint, T + pq + m ≤ I .
The optimal consumption of the good, q◦ ≡ q(I, T, p, s), is characterized by the following
5In Section 4.2, we incorporate competition into the model by means of the Nash bargaining solution.
6Introducing risk aversion into the seller gives rise to a hedging motive. Specifically, the risk-averse seller
would like to adopt marginal-cost pricing so as to eliminate the risk arising from his volatile operating profits.
The wedge between the optimal unit price and the constant marginal cost is as such jointly determined by
the efficient risk-sharing arrangement between buyers and the seller. Nevertheless, none of our qualitative
results are affected when the seller is de facto risk averse.
7Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼), while their realizations do not.
8It is noteworthy mentioning that Hayes’ (1987) model is along the line of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974,
1981) for a general two-commodity choice problem with a single exogenous random variable.
9We exclude any possibilities of reselling the good to other buyers.
optimal two-part pricing under demand uncertainty 5
first-order condition:
Uq(q
◦, m◦, s)− pUm(q
◦, m◦, s) = 0, (1)
while the optimal consumption of all other goods, m◦ ≡ m(I, T, p, s), is determined by the
binding budget constraint, i.e., m◦ = I −T −pq◦. The second-order condition requires that
∆ ≡ Uqq(q
◦, m◦, s) − 2pUqm(q
◦, m◦, s) + p2Umm(q
◦, m◦, s) < 0, (2)
which we assume to hold. Should the buyer elect not to pay the fixed fee, T , to the seller,
her ex-post utility is equal to U(0, I, s), for all s ∈ [s, s], and the seller’s profit from this
buyer is zero.
Anticipating buyers’ ex-post optimal consumption bundles, the seller devises the two-
part pricing contract, (T, p), so as to maximize his expected profit ex ante:
max
T,p
T + (p − c)E(q̃◦), (3)
subject to the following participation constraint of buyers:
E[U(q̃◦, m̃◦, s̃)] ≥ E[U(0, I, s̃)], (4)
where q̃◦ ≡ q(I, T, p, s̃), m̃◦ ≡ m(I, T, p, s̃), and E(·) is the expectation operator with respect
to the cumulative distribution function, F (s), of the state variable, s̃. It is clear from
program (3) that buyers’ participation constraint (4) must be binding at the optimum.10




U{q[I, T (p), p, s̃], m[I, T (p), p, s̃], s̃}
}
= E[U(0, I, s̃)]. (5)
Differentiating Eq. (5) with respect to p and rearranging terms yields
T ′(p) = −
E
{




Um{q[I, T (p), p, s̃], m[I, T (p), p, s̃], s̃}
} < 0, (6)
10Using Eq. (1), we have ∂E[U(q̃◦, m̃◦, s̃)]/∂T = −E[Um(q̃◦, m̃◦, s̃)] < 0. If buyers’ participation constraint
(4) is slack at the optimal two-part pricing contract, (T∗, p∗), the seller can increase the optimal fixed fee, T∗,
by an amount, ε > 0, such that E[U(q̃∗, m̃∗, s̃)] > E{U [q(I, T∗+ε, p∗, s̃), m(I,T∗+ε, p∗, s̃), s̃]} ≥ E[U(0, I, s̃)].
This contradicts the optimality of (T∗, p∗).
11Since ∂E[U(q̃◦, m̃◦, s̃)]/∂T = −E[Um(q̃◦, m̃◦, s̃)] < 0, where the equality follows from Eq. (1), and there
is no restriction on T , T (p) is indeed the unique solution to Eq. (5) for a given unit price, p.
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which implies that a higher unit price is associated with a lower fixed fee so as to keep buyers’




T (p) + (p− c)E{q[I, T (p), p, s̃]}, (7)
where T (p) is implicitly defined by Eq. (5).
3. Solution to the Model




∗), p∗, s̃] + E{qT [I, T (p
∗), p∗, s̃]}T ′(p∗)
}
+E{q[I, T (p∗), p∗, s̃]} + T ′(p∗) = 0, (8)
where p∗ is the optimal unit price. The second-order condition for program (7) is given by
T ′′(p∗) + 2E{qT [I, T (p




E{qT [I, T (p
∗), p∗, s̃]}T ′′(p∗) + E{qTT [I, T (p
∗), p∗, s̃]}T ′(p∗)2
+2E{qTp[I, T (p




which we assume to hold.
Let Cov(·, ·) be the covariance operator with respect to the cumulative distribution





∗, p∗, s̃)]− E[qT (I, T







∗, m̃∗, s̃), q̃∗]
E[Um(q̃∗, m̃∗, s̃)]
= 0, (10)
12For any two random variables, x̃ and ỹ, we have Cov(x̃, ỹ) = E(x̃ỹ) − E(x̃)E(ỹ).
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where q̃∗ ≡ q(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃), m̃∗ ≡ m(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃), and the optimal fixed fee, T ∗ = T (p∗), is
implicitly determined by the following binding participation constraint:
E[U(q̃∗, m̃∗, s̃)] = E[U(0, I, s̃)]. (11)
Solving Eqs. (10) and (11) simultaneously gives us the optimal two-part pricing contract,
(T ∗, p∗).
3.1. Risk-Neutral Buyers
As a benchmark, suppose that buyers are risk neutral. According to Stiglitz (1969),
risk neutrality is equivalent to linearity in wealth of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function for all fixed prices and states. Define V (I, T, p, s) ≡ U(q◦, m◦, s) as the ex-post
indirect utility function, where q◦ ≡ q(I, T, p, s) and m◦ ≡ m(I, T, p, s). It then follows
from Eq. (1) that VI(I, T, p, s) = Um(q
◦, m◦, s). Hence, linearity of V (I, T, p, s) in I for all
fixed two-part pricing contracts and states implies that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) is a constant, which,
without any loss of generality, is normalized to unity.13
Using the fact that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) = 1 for all fixed two-part pricing contracts and states,
we solve Eqs. (10) and (11) simultaneously to establish our first proposition. All proofs of
propositions are relegated to Appendix A.
Proposition 1. In the benchmark case of risk-neutral buyers, the profit-maximizing seller
sets the optimal unit price equal to the constant marginal cost, c, and the optimal fixed fee,
T 0, that solves E{U [q(I, T 0, c, s̃), m(I, T 0, c, s̃), s̃]} = E[U(0, I, s̃)].
Proposition 1 extends the celebrated results of Oi (1971) to the case of two commodities
and a single source of uncertainty. To see the intuition for why marginal-cost pricing is
optimal when buyers are risk neutral, we first compute the expected joint surplus, S(T, p),
of buyers and the seller for a given two-part pricing contract, (T, p):
S(T, p) = E[U(q̃◦, m̃◦, s̃)]− E[U(0, I, s̃)] + T + (p − c)E(q̃◦), (12)
where q̃◦ ≡ q(I, T, p, s̃) and m̃◦ ≡ m(I, T, p, s̃). The first-order conditions for maximizing
13Under Png and Wang’s (2010) quasi-linear specification (see Section 4), i.e., U(q, m, s) = u[b(q, s) + m],
the restriction due to risk neutrality on U(q, m, s) implies that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) = u′[b(q◦, s) + m◦] = 1 for all
fixed two-part pricing contracts and states. Hence, in this case, it must be true that u′(x) = 1, i.e., u(x) = x,
which is indeed the definition of risk neutrality in the Arrow-Pratt sense in which utility is a function of one
argument.
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the expected joint surplus in Eq. (12) are given by
ST (T
B, pB) = −E[Um(q̃
B, m̃B, s̃)] + 1 = 0, (13)
and
Sp(T
B, pB) = −E[Um(q̃
B, m̃B, s̃)q̃B] + E(q̃B) + (pB − c)E[qp(I, T
B, pB, s̃)] = 0, (14)
where (TB, pB) is the first-best two-part pricing contract, q̃B = q(I, TB, pB, s̃), and m̃B =
m(I, TB, pB, s̃). Since Um(q
◦, m◦, s) = 1 for all fixed two-part pricing contracts and states,
Eq. (13) holds for any value of TB. In other words, we can regard the fixed fee as a
pure transfer to the seller, thereby making the fixed fee irrelevant to the maximization of
the expected joint surplus. Since Um(q
B, mB, s) = 1 for all s ∈ [s, s], Eq. (14) implies
that pB = c. When buyers are risk neutral, marginal-cost pricing attains the maximum
expected joint surplus, SB = S(T, c), for any value of T . The profit-maximizing seller as
such optimally sets the unit price equal to the constant marginal cost. The optimal fixed
fee, T 0, is then the one that extracts the entire amount of SB, i.e., T 0 = S(T 0, c) = SB.
3.2. Risk-Averse Buyers
We now resume the original case that buyers are risk averse. Evaluating the left-hand side








Um{q[I, T (c), c, s̃], m[I, T (c), c, s̃], s̃}
} . (15)
Expression (15) is positive (negative) if the covariance of the marginal utility of all other
goods, Um{q[I, T (c), c, s̃], m[I, T (c), c, s̃], s̃}, and the consumption of the good, q[I, T (c), c, s̃],
is negative (positive). In this case, it follows from the second-order condition (9) and Eq.
(10) that p∗ > (<) c, which is exactly the same condition stated in Hayes (1987). Of
course, such a condition is not that informative since it depends on endogenously chosen
variables. It is thus of great interest to look for sufficient conditions under which we can
unambiguously sign expression (15).
It is well known that the covariance of two monotonically increasing functions of a ran-
dom variable is positive (see Theorem 236 in Hardy et al., 1964). Hence, to sign expression
(15), we must delve into the co-movement of the marginal utility of all other goods at the
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optimum, Um(q
◦, m◦, s), and the optimal consumption of the good, q◦, when the realized







> (<) 0, (16)
is proved to be crucial for determining the sign of expression (15).
Proposition 2. Given that condition (16) holds and the good is a normal good, i.e.,
qI(I, T, p, s) > 0, the profit-maximizing seller sets the optimal unit price, p
∗, lower (higher)
than the constant marginal cost, c, if Ums(q, m, s) ≥ (≤) 0. Given that condition (16) holds
and the good is an inferior good, i.e., qI (I, T, p, s) < 0, then p
∗ > (<) c if Ums(q, m, s) ≤
(≥) 0. Given that condition (16) holds and the optimal consumption of the good has no
wealth effect, i.e., qI (I, T, p, s) = 0, then p
∗ < (>) c if Ums(q, m, s) > 0, and p
∗ > (<) c if
Ums(q, m, s) < 0.
Condition (16) exhibits the differential Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property that is
central for monotone comparative statics analysis (see Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; Edlin
and Shannon, 1998). It reflects the notion that the tradeoff between the consumption of
the good, q, and that of all other goods, m, results in an increase in q and a decrease in
m when the realized state, s, is higher (lower), i.e., qs(I, T, p, s) > (<) 0. If the good is a
normal good, qs(I, T, p, s) > (<) 0 implies that the marginal utility of all other goods at the
optimum is enhanced (reduced) when the realized state increases, which reinforces the direct
effect that Ums(q, m, s) ≥ (≤) 0, so that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) unambiguously increases (decreases)
with an increase in s. Expression (15) as such is negative (positive), thereby rendering
p∗ < (>) c.14 On the other hand, if the good is an inferior good, qs(I, T, p, s) > (<) 0 implies
that the marginal utility of all other goods at the optimum is reduced (enhanced) when the
realized state increases, which reinforces the direct effect that Ums(q, m, s) ≤ (≥) 0, so that
Um(q
◦, m◦, s) unambiguously decreases (increases) with an increase in s. It then follows
that expression (15) is positive (negative) and thus p∗ > (<) c. Finally, if the optimal
consumption of the good has no wealth effect, the sate variable affects the marginal utility
of all other goods at the optimum solely through the direct effect, Ums(q, m, s). Hence, given
condition (16), we have p∗ < (>) c if Ums(q, m, s) > 0, and p
∗ > (<) c if Ums(q, m, s) < 0.
To see the intuition underlying Proposition 2, consider first the case that the marginal





m. In this example, we have Ums(q, m, s) = 0. Furthermore, the single-crossing property is
satisfied, i.e., ∂[Uq(q, m, s)/Um(q, m, s)]/∂s =
√
m/q > 0. The optimal consumption of the good is q◦ =
(I −T )/(p+ p2/s2) so that the good is a normal good. From Proposition 2, the optimal unit price, p∗, must
be less than the constant marginal cost, c, which is indeed what Hayes (1987) shows numerically by using a
two-state discrete distribution of s̃.
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utility of all other goods at the optimum, Um(q
◦, m◦, s), increases with an increase in the
realized state, s.15 Suppose that the seller offers the two-part pricing contract, [T (c), c], to
buyers. In this case, the seller earns the expected profit equal to T (c). Given condition
(16) that ensures qs(I, T, p, s) > (<) 0, Figure 1 depicts the optimal consumption of the
good at s = s, i.e., qc(s) ≡ q[I, T (c), c, s], and that at s = s, i.e., qc(s) ≡ q[I, T (c), c, s]
in Panel A (B) so that qc(s) < (>) qc(s). Let [T̂ (p), p] be the two-part pricing contract
that generates the same expected profit, i.e., T̂ (p)+ (p− c)E{q[I, T̂(p), p, s̃]} = T (c). If the
seller chooses to lower (raise) the unit price, p, below (above) the constant marginal cost,
c, he has to adjust the fixed fee, T̂ (p), upward (downward) from T (c) so as to keep the
expected profit constant at T (c). Given condition (16) that ensures qs(I, T, p, s) > (<) 0,
the seller alters the two-part pricing contract from [T (c), c] to [T̂ (p∗), p∗] with p∗ < (>) c
and T̂ (p∗) > (<) T (c). In this case, the optimal consumption of the good at s = s becomes
q̂(s) ≡ q[I, T̂(p∗), p∗, s], and that at s = s becomes q̂(s) ≡ q[I, T̂ (p∗), p∗, s]. As is shown in
Panels A and B of Figure 1, buyers’ utility falls when the realized state is low and rises
when the realized state is high. Since Um(q
◦, m◦, s) increases with an increase in s, the
utility loss in low states must be out-weighted by the utility gain in high states so that
buyers’ expected utility increases when the seller alters the two-part pricing contract from
[T (c), c] to [T̂ (p∗), p∗]:
E
{




U{q[I, T (c), c, s̃], m[I, T (c), c, s̃], s̃}
}
= E[U(0, I, s̃)], (17)
which reflects the insurance benefit that the two-part pricing contract offers to buyers. Since
buyers’ participation constraint (17) is slack, the seller raises the fixed fee from T̂ (p∗) to
T ∗ = T (p∗), making the resulting expected profit exceed T (c). Given condition (16) and
that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) increases with an increase in s, the seller indeed finds it optimal to set
the unit price below (above) the constant marginal cost, c.
(Insert Figure 1 here.)
Consider now the case that the marginal utility of all other goods at the optimum,
Um(q
◦, m◦, s), decreases with an increase in the realized state, s.16 Given the two-part
15If the good is a normal (an inferior) good, this is the case when qs(I, T, p, s) > (<) 0 and Ums(q, m, s) ≥ 0.
If the optimal consumption of the good has no wealth effect, this is the case when Ums(q, m, s) > 0.
16If the good is a normal (an inferior) good, this is the case when qs(I, T, p, s) < (>) 0 and Ums(q, m, s) ≤ 0.
If the optimal consumption of the good has no wealth effect, this is the case when Ums(q, m, s) < 0.
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pricing contract, [T (c), c], Figure 2 depicts the optimal consumption of the good, qc(s), at
s = s, and qc(s) at s = s. Since condition (16) implies that qs(I, T, p, s) > (<) 0, Panel
A (B) of Figure 2 shows that qc(s) < (>) qc(s). If the seller alters the two-part pricing
contract from [T (c), c] to [T̂ (p∗), p∗] with p∗ > (<) c and T̂ (p∗) < (>) T (c), the optimal
consumption of the good becomes q̂(s) at s = s and q̂(s) at s = s. As is evident from Panels
A and B of Figure 2, buyers’ utility falls when the realized state is high and rises when the
realized state is low. Since Um(q
◦, m◦, s) decreases with an increase in s, the utility loss in
high states must be out-weighted by the utility gain in low states so that Eq. (17) holds.
Since buyers’ participation constraint (17) is slack, the seller raises the fixed fee from T̂ (p∗)
to T ∗ = T (p∗), thereby rendering the expected profit to exceed T (c). Given condition (16)
and that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) decreases with an increase in s, we thus conclude that the optimal
unit price, p∗, is indeed above (below) the constant marginal cost, c.
(Insert Figure 2 here.)
4. A Quasi-Linear Specification
Png and Wang (2010) have recently revisited the model of Hayes (1987) by using a quasi-
linear specification of the ex-post utility function, U(q, m, s). Succinctly, Png and Wang
(2010) assume that U(q, m, s) = u[b(q, s)+m], where b(q, s)+m is the total benefit derived
from the consumption of q units of the good and m of all other goods when the prevailing
state is s, and u(x) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function defined over the ex-post
total benefit, x, with u′(x) > 0 and u′′(x) < 0, indicating the presence of risk aversion.
Imposing such a quasi-linear specification not only greatly enhances the tractability of
Hayes’ (1987) model, but also clearly identifies the underlying uncertainty as the uncertainty
about buyers’ demand (i.e., marginal benefit) for the good.
Png and Wang (2010) assume that buyers’ ex-post marginal benefit from consuming the
good is positive but diminishing, i.e., bq(q, s) > 0 and bqq(q, s) < 0, which is consistent with
Uq(q, m, s) > 0 and Uqq(q, m, s) < 0.
17 Png and Wang (2010) order the realizations of s̃ in
such a way that bs(q, s) > 0 for all s ∈ [s, s]. Under the quasi-linear specification, condition
(16) reduces to bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, which perfectly matches the two cases, (i) bqs(q, s) > 0
and (ii) bqs(q, s) < 0, that are the focuses of Png and Wang (2010). Since bs(q, s) > 0, case
(i) implies that buyers’ total and marginal benefits are positively correlated ex ante, while
case (ii) implies that they are negatively correlated ex ante.
17Since Uq(q, m, s) = u
′[b(q, s) + m]bq(q, s) and Uqq(q, m, s) = u
′′[b(q, s) + m]bq(q, s)
2 + u′[b(q, s) +
m]bqq(q, s), it follows that bq(q, s) > 0 and bqq(q, s) < 0 imply that Uq(q, m, s) > 0 and Uqq(q, m, s) < 0,
respectively. Furthermore, Um(q, m, s) = u
′[b(q, s) + m] > 0 and Umm(q, m, s) = u
′′[b(q, s) + m] < 0.
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Given that U(q, m, s) = u[b(q, s) + m], Eq. (1) reduces to bq[q(p, s), s] = p, so that
the optimal consumption of the good, q(p, s), depends neither on the initial wealth, I , nor
on the fixed fee, T , i.e., there is no wealth effect.18 Solving the binding budget constraint
yields the optimal consumption of all other goods, m(I, T, p, s) = I − T − pq(p, s). Hence,
the ex-post total benefit of buyers at the optimum is given by
x(I, T, p, s)≡ b[q(p, s), s] + m(I, T, p, s) = b[q(p, s), s] + I − T − pq(p, s). (18)
Since Ums(q, m, s) = u
′′[b(q, s) + m]bs(q, s) < 0, it follows immediately from Proposition
2 that p∗ > (<) c if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, which is consistent with the findings in Png and
Wang (2010). The optimal fixed fee, T ∗, is implicitly determined by the following binding
participation constraint:
E{u[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]} = E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]}, (19)
where x(I, T, p, s) is given by Eq. (18).
In the benchmark case that buyers are risk neutral, we have u(x) = x so that U(q, m, s) =
b(q, s)+m.19 It follows from Proposition 1 that the optimal unit price is equal to the constant
marginal cost, c.20 The optimal fixed fee, T 0, is then determined by the following binding
participation constraint under risk neutrality:
E[x(I, T 0, c, s̃)] = E[b(0, s̃) + I ]. (20)
Substituting Eq. (18) into Eq. (20) and solving for T 0 yields21
T 0 = E{b[q(c, s̃), s̃]} − E[b(0, s̃)] − cE[q(c, s̃)] > 0. (21)
We show in the following proposition that the optimal fixed fee, T ∗, is smaller or greater than
T 0, depending on whether buyers’ total and marginal benefits are positively or negatively
correlated, respectively.
Proposition 3. Given that buyers have the ex-post utility function, u[b(q, s)+m], satisfying
bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, the profit-maximizing seller sets the optimal unit price, p
∗, higher (lower)
18The second-order condition (2) is satisfied since bqq(q, s) < 0.
19Using the results in Hosoya (2011), we can interpret b(q, s) + m as the least concave utility function of
quasi-linear preferences.
20When buyers are risk neutral so that u(x) = x and p∗ = c, Eq. (9) reduces to E[qp(c, s̃)] < 0, which
holds since qp(p, s) = 1/bqq [q(p, s), s] < 0.
21Since b[q(c, s), s] − cq(c, s) > b(0, s) for all s ∈ [s, s], we have T 0 > 0.
optimal two-part pricing under demand uncertainty 13
than the constant marginal cost, c, and the optimal fixed fee, T ∗ > 0, lower (higher) than
the risk-neutral counterpart, T 0 > 0.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is the same as that for Proposition 2 when the marginal
utility of all other goods at the optimum satisfies that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) decreases with an
increase in the realized state, s. To see why T ∗ < (>) T 0 if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, suppose
that the seller offers the two-part pricing contract, (T 0, c), which is optimal under risk
neutrality, to buyers who are risk averse. If buyers were risk neutral, they would have
been indifferent between accepting and rejecting (T 0, c) given Eq. (20), which implies that
buyers derive the same expected total benefit with and without the right to purchase the
good from the seller. Since ∂[x(I, T 0, c, s)− b(0, s)]/∂s = bs[q(c, s), s]− bs(0, s) > (<) 0 if
bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, it follows from Eq. (20) that there must exist a critical realization of s̃
below which x(I, T 0, c, s) is less (greater) than b(0, s) + I , and above which x(I, T 0, c, s) is
greater (less) than b(0, s)+ I , thereby rendering x(I, T 0, c, s̃) to be more (less) volatile than
b(0, s̃) + I . Indeed, following the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3, we can easily
verify that the distribution of x(I, T 0, c, s̃) is a mean-preserving-spread of the distribution
of b(0, s̃) + I in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) if bqs(q, s) > 0, and that the
converse is true if bqs(q, s) < 0. Since buyers are risk averse, it follows from Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1971) that E{u[x(I, T 0, c, s̃)]} < E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]} and thus buyers strictly
prefer b(0, s̃) + I to x(I, T 0, c, s̃) if bqs(q, s) > 0. To induce buyers to accept the two-part
pricing contract, the seller has to cut the fixed fee below T 0 to T (c). Since p∗ > c, we have
T ∗ = T (p∗) < T (c) < T 0. On the other hand, if bqs(q, s) < 0, risk-averse buyers strictly
prefer x(I, T 0, c, s̃) to b(0, s̃) + I . The seller as such raises the fixed fee above T 0 to T (c) to
extract more rent from buyers. Since p∗ < c, we have T ∗ = T (p∗) > T (c) > T 0.22
4.1. Risk Aversion
Proposition 3 shows the global effect of imposing risk aversion onto buyers on the optimal
two-part pricing contract, (T ∗, p∗), i.e., (T ∗, p∗) is compared with the optimal one under
risk neutrality, (T 0, c). A related issue of interest is to study the marginal effect of increased
risk aversion of buyers on (T ∗, p∗). To this end, we follow Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) to
work with a differentiable family of utility functions, u(x, α), where α is a one sided index
of risk aversion. Given this notation, Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) show that an increase
in α represents an increase in risk aversion if, and only if, the coefficient of absolute risk
22Png and Wang (2010) show that T (c) < (>) T (p∗) = T∗ if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0. However, they do not
compare T 0 with either T (c) or T∗. Proposition 3 as such fills this gap.
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uxx(x, α)uxα(x, α)− ux(x, α)uxxα(x, α)
ux(x, α)2
> 0, (22)
i.e., an increase in α increases the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion for all
x ≥ 0.
We state the binding participation constraint of buyers as
E
{
u{x[I, T (p, α), p, s̃], α}
}
= E{u[b(0, s̃) + I, α]}, (23)
which defines the fixed fee, T (p, α), as a function of the unit price, p, and the index of risk
aversion, α. The first-order condition, Eq. (8), becomes
(p∗ − c)E[qp(p
∗, s̃)] + E[q(p∗, s̃)] + T ′(p∗, α) = 0. (24)









where we differentiate Eq. (23) with respect to p and α separately, and evaluate the resulting
derivatives at p = p∗ to yield
Tp(p
∗, α) = −
E{ux[x(I, T
∗, p∗, s̃), α]q(p∗, s̃)}






∗, p∗, s̃), α]} − E{uα[b(0, s̃) + I, α]}
E{ux[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃), α]}
. (27)
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (25) is the direct effect of increased risk aversion
on the optimal fixed fee, T ∗. The second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (25) captures
the indirect effect of increased risk aversion on T ∗ via its effect on the optimal unit price,
p∗. Eq. (26) implies that the indirect effect has the opposite sign to that of dp∗/dα.






Tpp(p∗, α) + 2E[qp(p∗, s̃)] + (p∗ − c)E[qpp(p∗, s̃)]
, (28)
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where we differentiate Eq. (23) twice with respect to p and α, and evaluate the resulting
derivative at p = p∗ to yield
Tpα(p
∗, α) = −
E{uxα[x(I, T
∗, p∗, s̃), α][Tp(p
∗, α) + q(p∗, s̃)]}




∗, p∗, s̃), α][Tp(p
∗, α) + q(p∗, s̃)]}
E{ux[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃), α]}
. (29)
It follows from the second-order condition (9) and Eq. (28) that the sign of dp∗/dα is the
same as that of Tpα(p
∗, α). Inspection of Eqs. (28) and (29) reveals that there are two
effects that jointly determine how increased risk aversion influences the optimal unit price,
p∗. The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (29) captures the pure effect of increased
risk aversion on p∗. The second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (29) captures the wealth
effect that arises from the direct effect of increased risk aversion on the optimal fixed fee,
T ∗. Specifically, if Tα(p
∗, α) > (<) 0, buyers’ wealth is reduced (increased) by this amount
for all s ∈ [s, s] as they become more risk averse, thereby giving rise to the wealth effect.23
The literature on risk aversion is completely silent about how increased risk aversion
affects marginal utility, i.e., the signs of uα(x, α), uxα(x, α), and uxxα(x, α). Thus, there is
no acceptable guidance that we can follow to determine the sign of Tα(p
∗, α), except in the
special case that buyers’ preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), i.e.,
−uxx(x, α)/ux(x, α) = α for all x ≥ 0, where α > 0 is the constant coefficient of absolute
risk aversion. Note that this is also the case considered by Png and Wang (2010) when they
examine how increased risk aversion of buyers affects the optimal two-part-pricing contract,
(T ∗, p∗). Under CARA, we have ux(x, α) = −αuxx(x, α). It then follows from Eq. (26) that
the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (29) vanishes. This is the well-known result
that CARA induces no wealth effect. Thus, dp∗/dα is solely determined by the pure effect
of increased risk aversion. The following proposition shows how an increase in buyers’ risk
aversion affects the optimal two-part pricing contract, (T ∗, p∗), under CARA.
Proposition 4. Given that buyers have the ex-post utility function, u[b(q, s) + m], sat-
isfying bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, and that u(x) exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, the profit-
maximizing seller raises (lowers) the optimal unit price, p∗, and lowers (raises) the opti-
mal fixed fee, T ∗, as the constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion, α, increases, i.e.,
dp∗/dα > (<) 0 and dT ∗/dα < (>) 0.
23In standard decision making problems, increased risk aversion seldom creates any wealth effect. In our
context, the wealth effect is driven by the binding participation constraint, Eq. (23), which is evidently
affected by the index of risk aversion, α. See also Wong (1997).
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When buyers’ preferences exhibit CARA, Png and Wang (2010) derive the same compar-
ative static results regarding the optimal unit price, p∗. Ignoring the direct effect, Tα(p
∗, α),
Png and Wang (2010) conclude that the effect of an increase in buyers’ risk aversion on the
optimal fixed fee, T ∗, is governed solely by the indirect effect, Tp(p
∗, α)× dp∗/dα. Indeed,
we show in Proposition 4 that the direct effect reinforces the indirect effect under CARA,
thereby making the overall effect of increased risk aversion on the optimal fixed fee, T ∗,
unambiguous under CARA.
4.2. Competition
To study how competition affects the optimal two-part pricing contract, (T ∗, p∗), we model
the determination of (T ∗, p∗) by the Nash bargaining solution. Let η be the bargaining
power of the seller, and 1 − η be that of buyers, where η ∈ [0, 1]. The Nash bargaining




T + (p− c)E[q(p, s̃)]
}η{
E{u[x(I, T, p, s̃)]} − E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]}
}1−η
, (30)
since buyers’ reservation utility would be E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]} and the seller’s profit would be
zero should no agreement be reached. When η = 1, the seller has all the bargaining power
and, thereby, is a monopoly. This extreme case has been thoroughly analyzed above (see
also Png and Wang, 2010). When η = 0, the seller has no bargaining power and, thereby,
is perfectly competitive. In this extreme case, Png and Wang (2010) show that the optimal
unit price is above or below the constant marginal cost depending on whether buyers’
total and marginal benefits are positively or negatively correlated, respectively, which are
qualitatively the same as those when η = 1. The seller makes zero expected profit so
that the optimal fixed fee is set to exactly offset the expected operating profit. In general
when η ∈ (0, 1), the seller possesses some, but not all, bargaining power and, thereby, is
imperfectly competitive. We hereafter interpret a lower value of η as a greater extent of
competition confronted by the seller.
The first-order conditions for program (30) are given by24
η
{
E{u[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]} − E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]}
}
−(1− η){T ∗ + (p∗ − c)E[q(p∗, s̃)]}E{u′[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]} = 0, (31)
24The second-order conditions for program (30) are assumed to hold.




E{u[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]} − E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]}
}
{E[q(p∗, s̃)] + (p∗ − c)E[qp(p
∗, s̃)]}
−(1− η){T ∗ + (p∗ − c)E[q(p∗, s̃)]}E{u′[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]q(p∗, s̃)} = 0. (32)
Multiplying E{u′[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]q(p∗, s̃)}/E{u′[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]} to Eq. (31) and subtracting
the resulting equation from Eq. (32) yields
η
{




E[q(p∗, s̃)] + (p∗ − c)E[qp(p
∗, s̃)]−
E{u′[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]q(p∗, s̃)}
E{u′[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]}
}
= 0. (33)
If η ∈ (0, 1), Eq. (33) reduces to
E[q(p∗, s̃)] + (p∗ − c)E[qp(p
∗, s̃)] =
E{u′[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]q(p∗, s̃)}
E{u′[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]}
. (34)
In the two extreme cases that η = 0 and η = 1, we know from Png and Wang (2010)
that Eq. (34) remains to be the optimality condition. Hence, the results of Proposition 3
regarding the optimal unit price, p∗, apply to all η ∈ [0, 1].
As a benchmark, suppose that buyers are risk neutral so that u(x) = x. It follows
from Eq. (34) with u′(x) = 1 that p∗ = c. The optimal fixed fee, denoted by T 0, is then
determined by Eq. (31) with u(x) = x and p∗ = c:
η{E[x(I, T 0, c, s̃)]− E[b(0, s̃) + I ]} − (1 − η)T 0 = 0. (35)
Substituting Eq. (18) into Eq. (35) and solving for T 0 yields
T 0 = η
{
E{b[q(c, s̃), s̃]} − E[b(0, s̃)]− cE[q(c, s̃)]
}
≥ 0, (36)
where the equality holds when η = 0. Inspection of the optimal two-part pricing contract,
(T 0, c), under risk neutrality reveals that introducing competition to the seller, i.e., setting
η < 1, renders buyers to enjoy a lower fixed fee, but has no effect on the optimal unit price.
To see why the optimal unit price is neutral to competition, we use Eqs. (12) and (18) to
write the expected joint surplus of buyers and the seller as
S(T, p) = E[x(I, T, p, s̃)] − E[b(0, s̃) + I ] + T + (p− c)E[q(p, s̃)]
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= E{b[q(p, s̃), s̃]} − E[b(0, s̃)] − cE[q(p, s̃)], (37)
which is maximized at p = c. Hence, Eq. (37) implies that the maximum expected joint
surplus is given by SB = S(T, c) = E{b[q(c, s̃), s̃]} − E[b(0, s̃)] − cE[q(c, s̃)]. The fixed fee,
T 0, is a pure transfer of this surplus, SB, between buyers and the seller. According to their
relative bargaining power, the seller receives ηSB and buyers receive (1−η)SB, as is evident
from Eqs. (35) and (36).
We characterize the optimal two-part pricing contract, (T ∗, p∗), of the Nash bargaining
solution, which solves Eqs. (31) and (34) simultaneously, in the following proposition.25
Proposition 5. Given that buyers have the ex-post utility function, u[b(q, s)+m], satisfying
bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, the Nash bargaining solution is the one at which the optimal unit price,
p∗, is set higher (lower) than the constant marginal cost, c, and the optimal fixed fee, T ∗,
is set lower (higher) than the risk-neutral counterpart, T 0 ≥ 0.
The intuition for Proposition 5 is similar to that for Proposition 3 and thus is omitted.
An immediate implication of Proposition 5 is that imposing competition onto the seller does
not seem to change the optimal two-part pricing contract in a qualitative manner. Indeed,
consider the case that buyers’ preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
so that the utility function, u(x), must take on the exponential form. Without any loss
of generality, let u(x) = −e−αx, where α > 0 is the constant coefficient of absolute risk
aversion. In this case, Eq. (34) reduces to







Inspection of Eq. (38) reveals that the optimal unit price, p∗, does not depend on the extent
of competition, η, confronted by the seller in the case of CARA. When u(x) = −e−αx, using




T ∗ + (p∗ − c)E[q(p∗, s̃)]
η + αη(1− η){T ∗ + (p∗ − c)E[q(p∗, s̃)]}
> 0, (39)
for all η ∈ (0, 1). Hence, Eq. (39) implies that as competition becomes lax, the seller with
greater bargaining power is able to charge a higher fixed fee under CARA. These results
are qualitatively the same as those under risk neutrality.
25If bqs(q, s) > 0, prudence, i.e., u
′′′(x) > 0, is called for to ensure that T∗ < T 0. As convincingly
argued by Kimball (1990, 1993), prudence is a reasonable behavioral assumption for decision making under
uncertainty. See also Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) for extending the concepts of prudence to multivariate utility
functions.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we re-examine the model of Hayes (1987) wherein a risk-neutral, profit-
maximizing monopoly (the seller) sells a good or service to buyers via a two-part pricing
contact. Demand uncertainty is modeled by a state variable that affects buyers’ ex-post
demand for the good. Prior to knowing the realization of the state variable, buyers have
to decide whether to subscribe to the two-part pricing contract offered by the seller or
not. When buyers are risk neutral, we show that marginal-cost pricing is not only profit-
maximizing but also socially efficient. When buyers are risk averse, demand uncertainty
calls for the insurance need of buyers, which induces the seller to deviate from marginal-
cost pricing. We show that the optimal unit price is higher or lower than the constant
marginal cost, depending on the nature of the good (normal or inferior) and on the signs of
cross-derivatives of buyers’ multivariate utility function.
Following Png and Wang (2010) to employ a quasi-linear specification that reduces the
general multivariate utility function to a special univariate utility function, we show that
the seller optimally raises (lowers) the unit price and lowers (raises) the fixed fee from their
risk-neutral counterparts if buyers’ total and marginal benefits are positively (negatively)
correlated, which are consistent with the results of the general model of Hayes (1987).
Confined to buyers’ preferences that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), we
show that the marginal effect of increased risk aversion of buyers on the optimal two-part
pricing contract inherits the global effect of risk aversion. Finally, we introduce competition
to the seller in a reduced form by using the Nash bargaining solution to determine the
optimal two-part pricing contract. We show that imposing competition onto the seller by
means of the Nash bargaining solution does not qualitatively alter the optimal two-part
pricing contract.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Since Um(q
∗, m∗, s) = 1 for all s ∈ [s, s], Eq. (10) reduces
to
(p∗ − c){E[qp(I, T
∗, p∗, s̃)]− E[qT (I, T
∗, p∗, s̃)]E(q̃∗)} = 0. (A.1)
Differentiating Eq. (1) with respect to T and rearranging terms yields




◦, m◦, s) − Uqm(q
◦, m◦, s)]. (A.2)
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Differentiating Eq. (1) with respect to p and rearranging terms yields




◦, m◦, s)− Uqm(q





+ qT (I, T, p, s)q
◦, (A.3)
where the second equality follows from Eq. (A.2) and the fact that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) = 1.








+ Cov[qT (I, T
∗, p∗, s̃), q̃∗]
}
= 0. (A.4)
The expression inside the curly brackets on the left-hand side of Eq. (A.4) vanishes only
in very special cases with measure zero. Hence, Eq. (A.4) implies that p∗ = c. From
Eq. (14), p∗ = c is also the optimal unit price that maximizes the expected joint surplus,
S(T, p), in Eq. (12). The optimal fixed fee, T 0, is then determined by solving Eq. (5) with
p = c. Hence, the seller’s maximum expected profit is equal to T 0 = S(T 0, c) = SB, thereby
rendering the optimality of the two-part pricing contract, (T 0, c).
Proof of Proposition 2. Differentiating Eq. (1) with respect to s and rearranging
terms yields


















where the second equality follows from Eq. (1), and ∆ < 0 from the second-order condition
(2). It follows from Eq. (A.5) that qs(I, T, p, s) > (<) 0 given condition (16). Differentiating
Um(q






◦, m◦, s)− pUmm(q
◦, m◦, s)]qs(I, T, p, s) + Ums(q
◦, m◦, s). (A.6)
Differentiating Eq. (1) with respect to I and rearranging terms yields




◦, m◦, s)− pUmm(q
◦, m◦, s)]. (A.7)
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According to Eq. (A.7), the good is a normal (an inferior) good, i.e., qI(I, T, p, s) > (<) 0,
if Uqm(q
◦, m◦, s)− pUmm(q
◦, m◦, s) > (<) 0.
Condition (16) implies that qs(I, T, p, s) > (<) 0. If the good is a normal good and
Ums(q, m, s) ≥ (≤) 0 , it then follows from Eq. (A.6) that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) is an increasing
(a decreasing) function of s. Expression (15) is, therefore, negative (positive) so that p∗ <
(>) c. On the other hand, if the good is an inferior good and Ums(q, m, s) ≤ (≥) 0, it
then follows from Eq. (A.6) that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) is a decreasing (an increasing) function
of s. Expression (15) is, therefore, positive (negative) so that p∗ > (<) c. Finally, if
the optimal consumption of the good has no wealth effect, i.e., qI(I, T, p, s) = 0, it then
follows from Eq. (A.6) that Um(q
◦, m◦, s) is an increasing (a decreasing) function of s if
Ums(q, m, s) < (>) 0. Given condition (16), expression (15) is negative (positive) so that
p∗ < (>) c if Ums(q, m, s) > 0, and expression (15) is positive (negative) so that p
∗ > (<) c
if Ums(q, m, s) < 0
Proof of Proposition 3. From Proposition 2, we have p∗ > (<) c if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0.
Suppose that T ∗ ≤ 0. Then, x(I, T ∗, p∗, s) ≥ b[q(p∗, s), s] + I − p∗q(p∗, s) > b(0, s) + I for
all s ∈ [s, s], and thus E{u[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]} > E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]}, a contradiction to Eq. (19).
Hence, we have T ∗ > 0. It remains to show that T ∗ < (>) T 0 if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0.
Let T n be the fixed fee that solves the following equation:
E[x(I, T n, p∗, s̃)] = E[b(0, s̃) + I ], (A.8)
where p∗ is the optimal unit price. Substituting Eq. (18) into Eq. (A.8) and solving for T n
yields
T n = E{b[q(p∗, s̃), s̃]} − E[b(0, s̃)] − p∗E[q(p∗, s̃)] > 0. (A.9)
We want to show that E{u[x(I, T n, p∗, s̃)]} < (>) E{u[b(0, s̃)+I ]} if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, which
is done by showing that the distribution of x(I, T n, p∗, s̃) is a mean-preserving-spread of the
distribution of b(0, s̃) + I in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) if bqs(q, s) > 0, and
that the converse holds if bqs(q, s) < 0.
Let Φ(x) be the cumulative distribution function of x̃ = x(I, T n, p∗, s̃). Since ∂x/∂s =
bs[q(p
∗, s), s] > 0, the inverse of x = x(I, T n, p∗, s) exists and is denoted by s = f(x).
Using the change-of-variable technique (see, e.g., Hogg and Craig, 1989), x̃ has support
[x(I, T n, p∗, s), x(I, T n, p∗, s)] and Φ(x) = G[f(x)]. We can express E{u[x(I, T n, p∗, s̃)]} in
terms of Φ(x):
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Likewise, let Ψ(z) be the cumulative distribution function of z̃ = b(0, s̃)+ I . Since ∂z/∂s =
bs(0, s) > 0, the inverse of z = b(0, s)+I exists and is denoted by s = g(z). Using the change-
of-variable technique (see, e.g., Hogg and Craig, 1989), z̃ has support [b(0, s)+I, b(0, s)+I ]
and Ψ(z) = G[g(z)]. We can express E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]} in terms of Ψ(z):




Note that ∂(x− z)/∂s = bs[q(p
∗, s), s]− bs(0, s). If bqs(q, s) > 0, we have ∂(x − z)/∂s > 0.
It then follows from Eq. (A.8) that b(0, s) + I > x(I, T n, p∗, s), b(0, s) + I < x(I, T n, p∗, s),
and that there exists a unique point, so ∈ (s, s), such that x > (<) z for all s > (<) so and
x = z = xo ∈ (b(0, s) + I, b(0, s) + I) at s = so. These observations imply that f(x) > g(x)
for all x ∈ [b(0, s) + I, xo) and f(x) < g(x) for all x ∈ (xo, b(0, s) + I ]. On the other hand,
if bqs(q, s) < 0, we have ∂(x − z)/∂s < 0. It then follows from Eq. (A.8) that b(0, s) + I <
x(I, T n, p∗, s), b(0, s) + I > x(I, T n, p∗, s), and that there exists a unique point, s ∈ (s, s),
such that x > (<) z for all s < (>) s and x = z = x ∈ (x(I, T n, p∗, s), x(I, T n, p∗, s))
at s = s. These observations imply that f(x) < g(x) for all x ∈ [x(I, T n, p∗, s), x) and
f(x) > g(x) for all x ∈ (x, x(I, T n, p∗, s)].
Consider first the case that bqs(q, s) > 0. Subtracting Eq. (A.10) from Eq. (A.11) yields
E{u[x(I, T n, p∗, s̃)]} − E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]} =
∫ x(I,T n,p∗,s)
x(I,T n,p∗,s)
u(x) d[Φ(x)− Ψ(x)], (A.12)





[Φ(y)− Ψ(y)] dy, (A.13)
for all x ∈ [x(I, T n, p∗, s), x(I, T n, p∗, s)]. Using Leibniz’s rule, we differentiate Eq. (A.13)











Φ(x) if x ∈ [x(I, T n, p∗, s), b(0, s) + I),
Φ(x)− Ψ(x) if x ∈ [b(0, s) + I, b(0, s) + I ],
Φ(x)− 1 if x ∈ (b(0, s) + I, x(I, T n, p∗, s)].
(A.14)
For all x ∈ [b(0, s)+I, xo), we have f(x) > g(x) so that Φ(x)−Ψ(x) = G[f(x)]−G[g(x)] > 0.
On the other hand, for all x ∈ (xo, b(0, s) + I ], we have f(x) < g(x) so that Φ(x)− Ψ(x) =
G[f(x)]−G[g(x)] < 0. It then follows from Eq. (A.14) that D(x) is strictly increasing for all
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x ∈ [x(I, T n, p∗, s), xo) and strictly decreasing for all x ∈ (xo, x(I, T n, p∗, s)]. Furthermore,
we have











which vanishes from Eq. (A.8). Hence, it follows from Eqs. (A.14) and (A.15) that D(x) > 0
for all x ∈ (x(I, T n, p∗, s), x(I, T n, p∗, s)). In other words, Φ(x) is a mean-preserving-spread
of Ψ(x) in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Integrating the right-hand side of
Eq. (A.12) by parts twice yields
E{u[x(I, T n, p∗, s̃)]} − E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]} =
∫ x(I,T n,p∗,s)
x(I,T n,p∗,s)
u′′(x)H(x) dx < 0, (A.16)
since u′′(x) < 0 (see also Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1971).
Consider now the case that bqs(q, s) < 0. Subtracting Eq. (A.11) from Eq. (A.10) yields
E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]} − E{u[x(I, T n, p∗, s̃)]} =
∫ b(0,s)+I
b(0,s)+I
u(x) d[Ψ(x) − Φ(x)], (A.17)





[Ψ(y) − Φ(y)] dy, (A.18)
for all x ∈ [b(0, s) + I, b(0, s) + I ]. Using Leibniz’s rule, we differentiate Eq. (A.18) with











Ψ(x) if x ∈ [b(0, s) + I, x(I, T n, p∗, s)),
Ψ(x) − Φ(x) if x ∈ [x(I, T n, p∗, s), x(I, Tn, p∗, s)],
Ψ(x) − 1 if x ∈ (x(I, T n, p∗, s), b(0, s) + I ].
(A.19)
For all x ∈ [x(I, T n, p∗, s), xo), we have g(x) > f(x) so that Ψ(x) − Φ(x) = G[g(x)] −
G[f(x)] > 0. For all x ∈ (xo, x(I, T n, p∗, s)], we have g(x) < f(x) so that Ψ(x) − Φ(x) =
G[g(x)]− G[f(x)] < 0. It then follows from Eq. (A.19) that D̂(x) is strictly increasing for
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all x ∈ [b(0, s) + I, x) and strictly decreasing for all x ∈ (x, b(0, s) + I ]. Furthermore, we
have











which vanishes from Eq. (A.8). Hence, it follows from Eqs. (A.19) and (A.20) that D̂(x) > 0
for all x ∈ (b(0, s) + I, b(0, s) + I). In other words, Ψ(x) is a mean-preserving-spread of
Φ(x) in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Integrating the right-hand side of Eq.
(A.17) by parts twice yields
E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]} − E{u[x(I, T n, p∗, s̃)]} =
∫ b(0,s)+I
b(0,s)+I
u′′(x)Ĥ(x) dx < 0, (A.21)
since u′′(x) < 0 (see also Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1971).
If bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, we have
E{u[x(I, T n, p∗, s̃)]} < (>) E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]} = E{u[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]}. (A.22)
Since ∂E{u[x(I, T, p∗, s̃)]}/∂T = −E{u′[x(I, T, p∗, s̃)]} < 0, it follows from Eq. (A.22) that




E{b[q(p, s̃), s̃]} − pE[q(p, s̃)]
}
= −E[q(p, s̃)] < 0, (A.23)
and p∗ > (<) c if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, Eqs. (21), (A.9), and (A.23) imply that T
0 > (<) T n if
bqs(q, s) > (<) 0. Hence, we conclude that T
∗ < (>) T 0 if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Define ŝ as the one at which q(p∗, ŝ) = −Tp(p
∗, α). Using
h(x) = −uxα(x, α)/ux(x, α) and Eq. (26), we can write
−E{uxα[x(I, T
∗, p∗, s̃), α][Tp(p
∗, α) + q(p∗, s̃)]}
= E
{
{h[x(I, T ∗, p∗, s̃)]− h[x(I, T ∗, p∗, ŝ)]}
×ux[x(I, T
∗, p∗, s̃), α][Tp(p
∗, α) + q(p∗, s̃)]
}
. (A.24)
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Note that
h′(x) =
uxx(x, α)uxα(x, α)− ux(x, α)uxxα(x, α)
ux(x, α)2
> 0, (A.25)
where the inequality follows from Eq. (22). Since bs(q, s) > 0, it follows from Eq.
(A.25) that ∂h[x(I, T, p, s)]/∂s = h′[x(I, T, p, s)]bs[q(p, s), s] > 0. Since qs(p, s) > (<) 0
if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, the sign of h[x(I, T
∗, p∗, s̃)] − h[x(I, T ∗, p∗, ŝ)] must be the same
as (opposite to) that of Tp(p
∗, I) + q(p∗, s̃) if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0. Hence, the right-hand
side of Eq. (A.24) is positive (negative) if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0. Under CARA, we have
ux(x, α) = −αuxx(x, α). It then follows from Eq. (26) that the second term of Eq. (29)
vanishes, thereby implying that dp∗/dα > (<) 0 if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0.
Under CARA, we can write buyers’ utility function as u(x, α) = −αne−αx, where n ≥ 0
is a constant. Define the two-part pricing contract, (T a, pa), that solves the following system
of equations:
E[x(I, T a, pa, s̃)] = E[b(0, s̃) + I ], (A.26)
and
E{uα[x(I, T
a, pa, s̃), α]} = E{uα[x(I, T
∗, p∗, s̃), α]}. (A.27)
Using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3, it follows from Eq. (A.26) that the
distribution of x(I, T a, pa, s̃) is a mean-preserving-spread of the distribution of b(0, s̃) + I
in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) if bqs(q, s) > 0, and that the converse holds
if bqs(q, s) < 0. Since u(x, α) = −α
ne−αx, we have uxxα(x, α) = α
n+1e−αx(αx − n − 2) < 0
for all x ≥ 0 if n is sufficiently large. In this case, we know from Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1971) that
E{uα[b(0, s̃) + I, α]} > (<) E{uα[x(I, T
a, pa, s̃), α]}, (A.28)
if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0. It then follows from Eqs. (27), (A.27), and (A.28) that Tα(p
∗, α) < (>) 0
if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0. Since dp
∗/dα > (<) 0 if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, it follows from Eq. (25) that
dT ∗/dα < (>) 0 if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0. Since von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
are unique up to affine transformations (see Varian, 1992), the optimal two-part pricing
contract, (T ∗, p∗), must be invariant to changes in n. Hence, the results on dT ∗/dα when
n is sufficiently large must remain valid for all n ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since buyers are risk averse, it follows from Eq. (34) that
p∗ > (<) c if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0 for all η ∈ [0, 1]. When η = 1, we know from Proposition 3
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that T ∗ < (>) T 0 if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0. When η = 0, we know from Png and Wang (2010)
that T ∗ = −(p∗ − c)E[q(p∗, s̃)] < (>) T 0 = 0 if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0. It remains to show that
T ∗ < (>) T 0 if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0 for all η ∈ (0, 1).
To characterize the optimal fixed fee, T ∗, for all η ∈ (0, 1), we denote T̂ (p) as the fixed
fee given by
T̂ (p) = η
{
E{b[q(p, s̃), s̃]} − E[b(0, s̃)]− pE[q(p, s̃)]
}
− (1− η)(p− c)E[q(p, s̃)]. (A.29)
It follows from Eq. (36) and (A.30) that T 0 = T̂ (c). Define the fixed fee, T̂ ∗ = T̂ (p∗). Since
∂{b[q(p, s), s]− pq(p, s)}/∂p = −q(p, s) < 0, we have
T 0 > η
{




E{b[q(p∗, s̃), s̃]} − E[b(0, s̃)]− p∗E[q(p, s̃)]
}
− (1 − η)(p∗ − c)E[q(p, s̃)]
= T̂ ∗, (A.30)
if p∗ > c. Differentiating Eq. (A.30) with respect to p yields
T̂ ′(p) = −E[q(p, s̃)]− (1− η)(p− c)E[qp(p, s̃)]. (A.31)
Since qp(p, s) = 1/bqq[q(p, s), s] < 0, Eq. (A.31) implies that T̂
′(p) < 0 for all p ≤ c. Hence,
if p∗ < c, we have T 0 < T̂ ∗. Evaluating the left-hand side of Eq. (31) at T = T̂ ∗ yields
η
{
E{u[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)]} − E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]}
}
−η{E[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)]− E[b(0, s̃) + I ]}E{u′[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)]}. (A.32)
If we can show that expression (A.32) is negative (positive) when bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, it then
follows from Eq. (31) and the second-order conditions for program (30) that T̂ ∗ > (<) T ∗.
If bqs(q, s) > (<) 0, we have p
∗ > (<) c so that T 0 > (<) T̂ ∗. Hence, we conclude that
T ∗ < (>) T 0 if bqs(q, s) > (<) 0.
Consider first the case that bqs(q, s) > 0. Since u
′′(x) < 0, we have
u[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s)]− u[b(0, s) + I ]
x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s)− b(0, s)− I
> (<) u′[b(0, s) + I ], (A.33)
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if x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s) < (>) b(0, s) + I . Multiplying x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s) − b(0, s) − I to both sides of
Eq. (A.33) and taking expectations with respect to G(s) yields
E{u[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)]} − E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]}
< E{u′[b(0, s̃) + I ][x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃) − b(0, s̃) − I ]}
= E{u′[b(0, s̃) + I ]}{E[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)]− E[b(0, s̃) + I ]}
+Cov{u′[b(0, s̃) + I ], x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃) − b(0, s̃)}. (A.34)
Note that ∂u′[b(0, s) + I ]/∂s = u′′[b(0, s) + I ]bs(0, s) < 0. Note also that ∂[x(I, T̂
∗, p∗, s) −
b(0, s)]/∂s = bs[q(p
∗, s), s] − bs(0, s) > 0 since bqs(q, s) < 0. Thus, the covariance term
on the right-hand side of Eq. (A.34) is negative. It then follows from Eq. (A.34) that
expression (A.32) is less than
η{E[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)] − E[b(0, s̃) + I ]}
×
{
E{u′[b(0, s̃) + I ]} − E{u′[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)]}
}
. (A.35)
Define the two-part pricing contract, (T c, pc), that solves the following system of equations:
E[x(I, T c, pc, s̃)] = E[b(0, s̃) + I ], (A.36)
and
E{u′[x(I, T c, pc, s̃)]} = E{u′[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)]}. (A.37)
Using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3, it follows from Eq. (A.36) that the
distribution of x(I, T c, pc, s̃) is a mean-preserving-spread of the distribution of b(0, s̃) + I
in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) since bqs(q, s) > 0. Given prudence, i.e.,
u′′′(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0, it follows immediately from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) that
E{u′[b(0, s̃) + I ]} < E{u′[x(I, T c, pc, s̃)]} = E{u′[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)]}. (A.38)
where the equality follows from Eq. (A.37). It then follows from expression (A.35) and Eq.
(A.38) that expression (A.32) is unambiguously negative when bqs(q, s) > 0.
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We now consider the case that bqs(q, s) < 0. Since u
′′(x) < 0, we have
u[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s)]− u[b(0, s) + I ]
x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s)− b(0, s)− I
< (>) u′[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s)], (A.39)
if x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s) < (>) b(0, s) + I . Multiplying x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s) − b(0, s) − I to both sides of
Eq. (A.39) and taking expectations with respect to G(s) yields
E{u[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)]} − E{u[b(0, s̃) + I ]}
> E{u′[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)][x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃) − b(0, s̃) − I ]}
= E{u′[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)]}{E[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)] − E[b(0, s̃) + I ]}
+Cov{u′[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃)], x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s̃) − b(0, s̃)}. (A.40)
Note that ∂u′[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s)]/∂s = u′′[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s)]bs[q(p
∗, s), s] < 0. Note also that
∂[x(I, T̂ ∗, p∗, s) − b(0, s)]/∂s = bs[q(p
∗, s), s] − bs(0, s) < 0 if bqs(q, s) < 0. Thus, the
covariance term on the right-hand side of Eq. (A.40) is positive. It then follows from Eq.
(A.40) that expression (A.32) is unambiguously positive when bqs(q, s) < 0. This completes
our proof.
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Figure 1: Buyers’ optimal consumption bundles for difference two-part pricing
contracts and states. Panel A depicts the case wherein p∗ < c and T̂ (p∗) > T (c) given
that qs(I, T, p, s) > 0. Panel B depicts the case wherein p
∗ > c and T̂ (p∗) < T (c) given that
qs(I, T, p, s) < 0.
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Figure 2: Buyers’ optimal consumption bundles for difference two-part pricing
contracts and states. Panel A depicts the case wherein p∗ > c and T̂ (p∗) < T (c) given
that qs(I, T, p, s) > 0. Panel B depicts the case wherein p
∗ < c and T̂ (p∗) > T (c) given that
qs(I, T, p, s) < 0.
